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Email Marketing › Troubleshooting

DMARC Failing

Why DMARC fails for some of your mail and how to fix it: unlisted senders, platform DKIM, unaligned SPF, forwarding, broken records and spoofing.
Troubleshootingintermediate9 min readUpdated

First, read the aggregate reports by source, not by total

A failure rate for the whole domain is almost meaningless, because one forgotten billing system and one spoofing campaign produce the same headline number and need opposite responses. Route the aggregate reports into a processor that groups them by sending source, meaning the sending IP addresses and the organisation that owns them, and for each source note three things: the volume, whether SPF passed and for which domain, and whether DKIM passed and for which domain. A source passes DMARC when at least one of those passes for a domain that matches the From domain, the alignment rule DMARC.org describes.

Then identify each source. Most legitimate ones are recognisable from the owner of the addresses: the marketing platform, the CRM, the help desk, the invoicing tool, the office mail service. Sources nobody recognises are either a system someone switched on without telling anyone, a forwarder relaying mail your subscribers chose to forward, or an impostor. Ask the owners of every team that sends mail before concluding it is spoofing. The authentication mechanics themselves are explained in the deliverability guide; this page assumes them and works from the report.

Diagnosis table

Diagnosis

SymptomCheckLikely causeFix
A recognisable business tool fails both SPF and DKIMWhether the tool is in SPF and has DKIM set up for your domainLegitimate system sending as the domain without authenticationAdd it to SPF or, better, set up DKIM signing with your domain
DKIM passes, but for the platform's own domainThe signing domain in the report or a message headerPlatform signing DKIM with its own domainConfigure custom DKIM with your domain in the platform
SPF passes, yet the source still fails DMARCThe envelope domain against the From domainSPF passing for a return-path domain that is not alignedRely on aligned DKIM, or set a custom return path on your domain
Small failing volumes from mailbox providers and list serversWhether DKIM survives on those copiesForwarding and mailing lists breaking SPF on relayed mailMake sure DKIM signs with your domain; accept the residual
Many sources fail SPF at once, including ones that used to passAn SPF syntax check and its lookup countSPF record over the lookup limit or published with errorsRepair the record; remove unused includes; move senders to DKIM
Unknown sources, often from scattered networks, failing everythingWhether anyone in the business owns themUnauthorised senders spoofing the domainLeave them failing; move the policy towards enforcement

Fix, verify and prevent each cause

A business system nobody authenticated

The classic failing source is legitimate and forgotten: the CRM that sends sales follow-ups, the support desk that sends ticket replies, the billing tool that sends invoices, all using the company domain in the From address and none of them listed in SPF or signing with DKIM. Under a monitoring policy their mail still arrives, so nobody notices until enforcement starts refusing it.

Fix: for each such system, enable DKIM signing with your own domain using the keys it provides, and add it to SPF only if it supports a return path on your domain; the deliverability guide is explicit that every system sending as the domain must be covered. Consider whether the system should use its own subdomain, which keeps its reputation apart in the way the promotional versus transactional comparison recommends for separate streams.

Verify: the next reports show the source passing with an aligned DKIM domain.

Prevent: add an email-authentication step to the approval of any new tool.

DKIM signed with the platform's domain

Many sending platforms sign every message out of the box with their own domain. The signature is valid, so DKIM "passes", but for a domain that has nothing to do with your From address, and DMARC ignores it.

Fix: set up custom or branded DKIM in the platform, publishing the selector records it gives you so that it signs with your domain or the subdomain you send from.

Verify: a message header and the next aggregate report show DKIM passing for your domain, not the platform's.

Prevent: treat custom DKIM as part of onboarding any sending platform, and recheck after a platform migration, when it is commonly lost.

SPF passing for someone else's domain

SPF is evaluated against the envelope sender, the hidden return path used for bounces, which platforms often set to their own domain. The report then shows an SPF pass that cannot help, because the domain is not aligned with the From address. Teams see "SPF pass" and stop looking.

Fix: the simplest route is aligned DKIM, which makes SPF alignment unnecessary for DMARC; where the platform supports a custom return path on your domain, configuring it adds a second aligned pass. Google's sender guidelines document alignment of the From domain with either the SPF or the DKIM domain for bulk senders.

Verify: the source passes DMARC through at least one aligned mechanism in every report period.

Prevent: when checking a new source, record the domain each check passed for, never just the word "pass".

Forwarded and relayed mail

When a subscriber's mailbox forwards a message elsewhere, or a mailing list redistributes it, the copy is sent by a server you never listed, so SPF fails for it. If the list also rewrites the subject or appends a footer, the DKIM signature breaks too. These sources appear in the reports as mailbox providers and list servers with modest, steady volumes.

Fix: there is nothing to configure for the forwarder; what you control is a DKIM signature on your own domain, which survives plain forwarding and keeps most relayed copies passing. Google's guidelines also document headers that forwarders are expected to add.

Verify: the failing share for these sources falls once DKIM is aligned, leaving a small residual of altered copies.

Prevent: do not chase the residual, and do not loosen the policy for it.

A broken or overloaded SPF record

SPF records allow a limited number of DNS lookups, and each include for another service can add several. A domain that has added tool after tool can exceed the limit, at which point SPF returns an error for every message, and a single syntax mistake, or two SPF records on one domain, has the same effect. The symptom is failures appearing at once across sources that passed last month.

Fix: check the record with an SPF validator, remove includes for services no longer used, and move senders that support DKIM off SPF so they stop consuming lookups; the deliverability guide lists the lookup limit among SPF's common failures.

Verify: the validator reports a single valid record within the limit, and the next reports show SPF passing again for the affected sources.

Prevent: keep SPF changes under change control with a named owner, so nobody edits it to add one tool and breaks every other.

Spoofing: failures that should stay failures

Some failing sources are impostors: phishing or spam that puts your domain in the From address. These failures are DMARC working, and the reports are how you see them.

Fix: confirm with every sending team that the source is not theirs, then leave it failing and continue moving the policy through quarantine to reject so that receivers refuse it; the fundamentals hub sets out the weekly report check that catches new impostors.

Verify: after enforcement, the impostor's volume in the reports shows as rejected or quarantined rather than delivered.

Prevent: keep the policy at enforcement once reached, and monitor lookalike domains separately, because DMARC protects only the exact domain it is published on.

Prevention: a sender inventory and a staged policy

DMARC failures come back whenever someone adds a sender without telling the person who owns the domain. The durable fix is an inventory: a short register of every system that sends as the domain or a subdomain, with its owner, its purpose, the DKIM selector it signs with and whether it uses a custom return path. The approach mirrors the inventory the tag governance guide recommends for scripts on a website, and it works for the same reason: adding a tool is easy, so the register has to be part of switching one on. New tools are approved only once they are in the register and signing with the domain. The email sending domain setup checklist builds the same checks into the switch-on of any new sender or platform, from SPF and DKIM to reading the reports before the policy is tightened.

The policy then moves in stages. Start at monitoring and read the reports weekly until every legitimate source passes and aligns. Move to quarantine, at partial coverage if the processor and the policy allow it, then to full coverage, then to reject, holding at each stage long enough to see a full business cycle of senders such as month-end invoicing. After enforcement, read the reports monthly and treat any new failing source as a question for the register. Put the aligned pass rate of legitimate sources into the monthly report as an indicator (KPI), because an invoice or receipt that is quarantined never earns the click (CTR) or the payment it was sent for, and the first sign of a broken sender is often a finance team asking why customers did not receive mail. When that question arrives, the diagnosis for order and account emails not arriving starts from the customer's missing receipt and works back to the sending system.

Illustrative example — not a real result

A training company's reports before enforcement

A training company publishes DMARC at monitoring and routes the aggregate reports into a processor. After four weeks the reports show about 210,000 messages a month from eleven sources. The marketing platform passes with aligned DKIM. The office mail service passes. Three sources fail: a booking system sending 9,000 confirmation emails a month with SPF passing for the vendor's domain and no DKIM; a survey tool sending 1,200 messages with nothing configured; and a cluster of unknown addresses sending around 3,000 messages, none of them recognised by any team. Mailbox-provider forwarders account for a further 600 failures. The team sets up DKIM for the booking system and the survey tool, then waits two more report cycles: both now pass. The policy moves to quarantine in week eight and to reject in week fourteen, and the unknown cluster's mail now appears in the reports as rejected.

Common mistakes

Reading the domain-wide pass rate instead of the sources. Treating "SPF pass" as aligned without checking the domain. Jumping to reject before the booking, billing and support systems are fixed. Chasing forwarding failures that DKIM already covers. Adding includes to SPF until it breaks. Assuming every unknown source is spoofing without asking the teams that send mail.

Frequently asked questions

How can SPF pass and DMARC still fail?

SPF checks the domain in the envelope sender, the return path that bounces go to, and many platforms use their own domain there. The check passes, but for the platform's domain rather than yours. DMARC asks that the domain which passed matches the domain in the visible From header, so an SPF pass on someone else's domain does not count. Either configure a custom return path on your own domain or, more simply, make sure the platform signs DKIM with your domain.

Should we move to a reject policy to stop the failures?

A reject policy stops failing mail from being delivered; it does not stop the failures. If any legitimate system is among the failing sources, its mail will be refused too. Move to quarantine and then reject only once the aggregate reports show every legitimate source passing and aligned, as DMARC.org recommends, and keep reading the reports afterwards for systems added later.

Do failures from forwarded mail mean something is misconfigured?

Usually not on your side. When a recipient's mailbox forwards a message, it is relayed from the forwarder's server, which your SPF record does not list, so SPF fails for that copy. A DKIM signature normally survives forwarding unless the message is altered, which is why signing with your own domain keeps forwarded mail passing. Small volumes of forwarding failures are expected and need no action beyond reliable DKIM.

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Also related

Sources

  1. DMARC overview — DMARC.org
  2. Email sender guidelines — Google Workspace Admin Help

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