Why a new feature raises a packaging question
The pricing and packaging guide builds plans from segments: each segment the positioning names should find one option that fits it naturally, with fences between plans that follow value and add-ons for what a minority values highly. That structure is designed once and then meets a stream of new capabilities. Each one has to land somewhere, and the guide's own answer on how often packaging should change says packaging should be looked at again each time a major capability arrives, since someone has to decide its tier.
The question is easy to skip. A feature built by the product team goes live for every customer because that is how the release was configured. Or a sales leader asks for it to be put in the top plan, so that customers have a new reason to upgrade, and the request becomes the decision. Both are placements. The first may give away something a segment would have paid for and leave the higher plans looking thin; the second may hold back something all buyers rely on, which customers feel as a punishment, not a reason to move up, and may contradict a launch message that presents the feature as part of what the product now is.
In the Product Marketing Alliance's view, communicating price belongs to the product marketer's job, as the pricing guide reports, and a feature's placement is exactly that: a price decision that is also a message. The launch intake tutorial already asks product management whether a release changes price, packaging or plans, and treats any release that does as never silent. This guide picks up where that question is answered "yes, or it might": it decides what the change should be. The product positioning hub places pricing and packaging among the deliverables that follow from the positioning, and a placement is one more of them.
The options: every plan, a higher plan, an add-on or a product of its own
There are four main answers, and a few common variations on them.
| Option | What it tells buyers | Suits | Watch for |
|---|---|---|---|
| Every plan | This is part of what the product is | A capability that relieves a pain for every segment, or that the launch presents as central | Costs that grow with use and are now carried by every plan, including the cheapest |
| The higher plans only | This is what the larger or more demanding buyer needs | Value that only some segments reach, such as controls, administration or heavy use | A fence on something every buyer needs; customers on lower plans who expected it |
| A paid add-on | Anyone who needs it can have it, at a stated price | A capability a minority values highly, spread across every plan | Anything the messaging presents as central; one more line on every quote, page and invoice |
| A product of its own | This does a different job, perhaps for a different buyer | A capability with its own buyer, budget or job, bought apart from the core product | No longer a packaging decision: naming, architecture and go-to-market questions follow |
The variations sit between these. A feature can be included in every plan with a limit that only heavy users reach, which turns it into a usage fence. It can be included in the higher plans and offered to the lower ones as an add-on, which suits a feature one segment needs routinely and another occasionally. It can join a bundleSeveral products sold together as one item at a single price, used to raise order value; a kit is a bundle designed as a starting point for new customers. with related capabilities sold together. Each variation adds something for buyers and sellers to understand, so use one only when the evidence shows a real difference between segments, not to keep every option open.
The fourth option deserves a warning. Once a capability is sold as a product of its own, its name and its relationship to the main brand are questions for the brand architecture guide, and taking it to buyers who are not yet customers is a go-to-market plan in its own right. Product marketing still owns the message, but the decision is larger than packaging and should be treated so.
Evidence: who the feature is for and what it is worth to them
The placement follows from two questions: which segments the feature serves, and how much it matters to each of them. The value proposition canvas helps set them side by side. Strategyzer's canvas puts the customer's jobs, pains and gains on one side and what the product offers on the other, and the pricing guide turns that map into a packaging rule: a capability that eases a pain shared by all segments goes into all plans, while one only a single segment feels becomes a fence or an add-on. Draw the map for the new feature against each segment the positioning names, not against the customer base as a whole.
Then gather the evidence that fills the map:
- The beta, if there was one. A betaSelected customers use a working product or feature before general release, so the business learns whether it works for them and what the launch needs. run as the beta programme tutorial describes, with participants chosen against the target segments and activation watched rather than enthusiasm, shows which segments reached the feature's value and which tried it once. Read the result by segment and plan, not as one total.
- Conversations with buyers and losses. Short customer interviews with recent buyers and recent losses, asking what they used or would use the feature for and what they compared it with, show the job behind it and the reference point buyers use.
- What sales and support already hear. Lost-deal notes that name the missing capability, the segment of each of those deals, and support requests asking for it, show who has been asking and how often.
- Behaviour in the product. Use of the adjacent features the new one extends, by plan, is a fair guide to who will use it once it exists.
Treat what customers say they would pay for an add-on with care. As the stated and revealed preference framework shows, what people say they would buy and what they do buy often disagree, so a survey answer is a hypothesis to check against behaviour rather than a forecast. Much of this evidence comes in small numbers, such as a modest beta or a short list of lost deals. Read it as the guide to reading small numbers advises, as a direction with a wide margin rather than a measurement.
Finally, check the economics with finance. Some features cost little to run whoever uses them; others carry a cost for every active user, such as storage, messaging or a third party's charges. The break-even calculator shows how many add-on sales or upgrades a placement needs before it covers what it costs to run, which can be the fact that rules an option in or out.
Tests the placement has to pass
Evidence points to an option; a few tests check that the option will work once it meets buyers, sellers and the billing system.
- It matches the message. If the launch will present the feature as a pillar of the product, the messaging hierarchy cannot sit beside an add-on that most buyers will never see. The pricing guide says add-ons suit badly anything the messaging presents as central.
- The fence follows value. A higher-plan placement should withhold something only some buyers need, as the good-better-best pattern asks of every fence, not something every buyer needs to get the product's basic job done.
- It suits the pricing metric. Where the price already grows with use and the feature drives use, including it may already pay for itself through the metric; where the metric is fixed, the cost of a heavily used feature lands on the business.
- It can be explained in one sentence. Describe the placement to a buyer and to a seller. If either needs it repeated, or the first question is how to get the feature without paying for the plan, the placement is working against the product.
- It keeps existing promises. Check what the pricing pageThe page where buyers compare plans and prices, treated as a conversion step that shows who each plan is for, the complete cost and the next step., proposals, contracts and roadmap statements already say about the plans. The roadmap guide treats a written commitment about a future capability as one the buyer may rely on.
- The systems can carry it. An add-on has to be bought, shown, billed and cancelled; a higher-plan feature has to show customers on lower plans what it is and what moving up would cost.
Reversibility matters as well. The framework of one-way and two-way doors separates decisions that are cheap to reverse from those that are not, and feature placement is asymmetric. Adding a feature to more plans later is easy and welcome. Removing it from a plan customers already pay for is, for those customers, a retirement and a price change, and the guide to retiring a feature treats that as a one-way door for anyone who depends on it. When the evidence is genuinely balanced, that asymmetry is a reason to choose the placement that can be widened rather than the one that may need to be narrowed.
Existing customers: who gets it and on what terms
A placement is decided for the plans, but it is felt by customers who are already on them. Work through each group before the decision is final.
| Group | What they need to hear | Where it is covered |
|---|---|---|
| Customers on the plans that get it | That it is now part of their plan, what it does and how to start | Release notes, the launch plan |
| Customers on plans that do not | What it is, which plan or add-on includes it and what that costs, without pressure | Upgrade prompts, the price change guide where a plan changes |
| Beta participants | What the beta terms promised about access and price at the end, honoured exactly | The beta tutorial |
| Customers who lose something they had | That their plan is changing, why, when and what their options are | The retirement and price change guides |
| Contracted or negotiated accounts | A call from the account manager first, then written notice, inside the contract's terms | The account manager, the price change guide's sequence |
Customers on plans that do not get the feature will meet it in the product, in the release notesNotes published with a product release telling the people who use it what changed, who has it and from when, written for users, not as ticket titles. and in campaigns. The upgrade paths guide sets out how a prompt should behave when a customer reaches for a feature their plan does not include: explain the action that was blocked, name the plan that permits it and its price, show how to switch, and let the customer continue on the plan they have. A launch email to those customers that hides the price, or a prompt that blocks with a bare instruction to upgrade, turns a product announcement into a cross-sellingOffering a customer a related product alongside the one they are buying; upselling offers a higher-value version instead. push they did not ask for.
The hardest case is a feature that replaces something customers already had in their plan, such as a new version that sits in a higher plan while the old one is switched off. For those customers it is a removal, and the retirement guide's evidence note on who relies on it, the phased timeline and the messages by impact all apply. Where they would have to pay more to keep doing the same job, it is also a price change, which the guide to communicating a price change handles: it counts customers whose plan is withdrawn among the groups it plans messages for, briefs sales and support before anyone else, and sets notice inside what contracts and local law require. Letting existing customers keep the capability for a period while new customers find it in the higher plan can be the gentler route, since the pricing guide notes that grandfathering keeps a pricing improvement from becoming a churn event. Whatever is chosen, what customers are entitled to depends on the terms they signed; this guide is not legal advice.
Deciding, recording and revisiting
Pricing usually has no single owner. The pricing guide describes an arrangement that works: a few people meeting as a pricing group, with product marketing running it, finance able to block anything the economics do not support and one named executive approving, while product management, which owns what goes into the product, says what will be built. A feature's placement goes through the same group, as a short proposal: the options considered, the evidence, the tests, the effect on existing customers and the recommendation.
Timing decides how much rework the decision causes. The intake form flags the question; the review that proposes the launch tier is the natural point for a placement proposal; and the decision is needed before beta participants are told what happens at the end of the beta and before launch assets are written. If the scope, the audience or the cost of the feature changes, reopen the placement in the same way the intake tutorial reopens the tier.
Record the decision where the next person will find it. The marketing decision log template gives a decision logA running record, one row per decision, of what changed and why, what was expected, who decided and when the result will be checked. the columns a placement needs: the change, the evidence, whether it can be reversed, the expected effect, the guardrail that would reverse it and the date it will be read. For a placement, the expected effect is usually some mix of adoption on the plans that have it, upgrades or add-on sales among customers who do not, deals won where the feature was asked for, and no rise in churn rateShare of customers at the start of a period who left during it. among customers on the plans that do not have it.
Read those effects at the post-launch review that the measuring launch success guide describes, keeping upgrades apart from new sales and reading them by cohort, as the upgrade paths guide advises. Watch for two signals that the placement is wrong whatever the headline figures say: sellers routinely giving the add-on away to close deals, which the pricing guide's discount governance would catch, and support hearing customers ask why a feature everyone needs sits in a plan they cannot afford. Over time, many placements made one at a time drift the plans away from the segments they were built for. When that happens, the answer is a review of the packaging as a whole in the pricing guide, not another placement. The tutorial on running a pricing and packaging review walks that review, from the trigger and one evidence pack to the decision record and the read against a guardrail.
Everything that changes once the plan is chosen
A placement decided in a meeting has to reach every surface that describes the plans, on the same day, or customers will find the contradictions before the business does.
| Surface | What changes | Covered in |
|---|---|---|
| Pricing page and plan comparison | The feature in the right column, with any limit or add-on price stated in full | Designing a pricing page |
| Release notes and changelog | Which plans have it, from when, and whether it is rolling out | Writing release notes and a changelog |
| In-product prompts and the upgrade screen | What customers on other plans see, with the full cost before they commit | The upgrade paths guide |
| Sales deck, demo and battlecards | Which plan is shown, how it compares with a competitor's placement | Building a core sales deck, Competitive battlecards |
| Quotes, order forms and contracts | The plan schedules and any add-on line | Sales operations and whoever drafts contracts |
| Help centre and support replies | Which plans have it and what to say to customers who do not | Support, briefed before launch |
| Messaging and launch plan | The proof for each segment and the bill of materials | Launch planning and launch tiers |
Two rules hold across all of them. The sales deckThe slide story a seller tells in a first meeting, built from the messaging so every seller tells the same story in the same order with proof under each claim. and the pricing page should never disagree about which plan includes the feature, because buyers believe the page. And the price a customer sees should be the price they pay: the pricing guide notes that UK consumer protection law, enforced by the Competition and Markets Authority, reaches misleading pricing such as charges that only appear late in a purchase, so an add-on's charge belongs on the page and the upgrade screen, not only on the invoice. None of this is legal advice; a placement that changes what existing customers pay should be checked by whoever handles compliance before it is announced.
A music teaching software places its practice tracker (illustrative)
Krenvalto places its practice tracker
Krenvalto, an invented scheduling and billing service for independent music teachers and small music schools, sells three plans: Solo at £9 a month for one teacher, Studio at £24 for up to 5 teachers and School at £59 for larger schools. Its new feature lets pupils log practice and upload short recordings for their teacher to hear. Sales asked for it to go into School only, to give studios a reason to upgrade; engineering had configured it for everyone.
The product marketer ran the evidence before the intake review. In a 10-week beta with 30 accounts, 6 of 7 schools and 5 of 7 studios used the tracker every week, against 5 of 16 solo teachers, most of whom used it for a few pupils preparing for exams. Notes on 9 lost school and studio deals over two quarters named a rival's practice tracker. Finance put the cost of storing recordings at about £0.40 per active pupil a month, which ruled out including it in Solo at its price. A School-only fence failed the value test, because studios used it nearly as heavily as schools.
The pricing group chose: included in Studio and School, and available to Solo teachers as an add-on at £4 a month. The 16 solo beta participants kept it free for 6 months, as their beta terms had promised. The pricing page, release notes, upgrade prompt, deck and help article changed on launch day, and the decision went into the log with a check date two quarters out.
At the check, 138 Solo teachers had bought the add-on and 41 had moved to Studio, against 19 Solo-to-Studio moves in the two quarters before. Solo's monthly churn was 2.0%, against 2.1% before. The win rate in school and studio deals where the rival was named rose from 6 of 19 to 11 of 23, which the team logged as encouraging but too few deals to call. The add-on price stayed under review because sellers had waived it in 7 deals.
Common mistakes
- Letting the default decide. A feature that ships to everyone because nobody asked, or to the top plan because someone asked loudest, has still been placed; it has just not been decided.
- Fencing a feature to manufacture upgrades. A higher-plan placement for something every buyer needs reads as a penalty, and the customers it is meant to move are the ones most likely to leave.
- Making the launch's headline an add-on. If the message says the feature changes what the product is, most buyers should be able to use it.
- Deciding after the beta invitations or the launch assets. Participants promised continued access and assets written for the wrong plan both have to be unpicked.
- Narrowing later without treating it as a retirement. Moving a feature out of a plan customers already pay for needs the evidence, the notice and the options of a retirement and a price change.
- Changing some surfaces and not others. Release notes that say every plan, a page that says one and a deck that says another send customers to support and sellers to improvise.
- Hiding the add-on's price. A charge that appears only at checkout or on the invoice damages trust and invites complaints.
- Judging the placement from one quarter's handful of upgrades. Read the effect by cohort, beside churn and discounting, and with the margin small numbers deserve.
